Abstract: This paper will assess the effectiveness of the reform of improving public service delivery and identify the factors responsible for the improvements in public service delivery in Qingdao municipality of Shandong province in the People's Republic of China. This paper begins with a description of the policy context and discusses how the policy context affects the improvement of public service delivery in Qingdao municipality. It then discusses the efforts of improving the delivery of public service through enhancing human service delivery, reforming the administrative approval system and increasing government transparency and public participation in Qingdao municipality. Finally, this paper will identify the factors affecting the improvement of public service delivery in Qingdao municipality in terms of the decentralization of economic management, tax profit sharing with the local government, political control, the delegation of law-making and the local leadership.
T he transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy in China has brought about the emphasis on government functions in the public service sector. In a centrally planned economy, the State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) provided their employees with all kinds of benefits such as child care, medical care, pensions, housing and security. After the transition to a market economic system, the SOEs would unavoidably reduce some of these benefits such as medical and child care due to the urgent need to cut budgets to enhance their competitiveness in the market. On the other hand, in a market economy, the SOEs might also be bankrupt, which is "a phenomenon inconceivable in a centrally planned economy, but quite possible in a market economy" (Asian Development Bank [ADB], 2003, p. 56) . Therefore, employees may face more risks than ever such as being retrenched and the loss of pension or other welfare benefits. This situation had produced much pressure for the municipal governments to carry out the administrative reform for strengthening the service delivery functions. Therefore, local government reform in the Qingdao municipality since 1999 sought to improve government functions in human service delivery (Shandong Provincial Government, 2000, p. 2) .
Moreover, the transition from a planned economy to a market economy in China also required the local government to improve its regulatory services. The market economic reform allowed the local government to be freed from the functions of micro-management as well as enterprise management and to concentrate on indirect macroeconomic regulation. However, the increasing influence of the private sector in the market required the local government to rely more heavily on implementing the regulations given the severity of the problems in the market place in China, such as unfair competition, lack of protection of intellectual properties and fraud which had disrupted the market order and dampened consumers' interests. In this case, the regulatory activities of local government became rapidly expansive (ADB, 2003, pp. 57-58) . This expansion of regulation created a situation where enterprises and citizens must go through many different government departments to obtain approvals for their private business. These cumbersome administrative procedures were blamed for wasting too much time for foreign investors and clients; at the same time, these procedures weakened the efficiency of local government.
The local government often utilized its regulatory power to "protect or expand departmental or local interests rather than to further develop the market. As a result rent-seeking opportunities abound" (ADB, 2003, p. 62) . At the same time, the phenomenon of "sanluan (Three Unrulies)": unruly levies (luanshoufei), forced donations (luantanpai), and fines (luanfakuan) had also breached the trust of the public for the local government. Some government agencies did not standardize the administrative and institutional costs (xingzheng shiyexing shoufei) on drugs, water, power supplies and medical care, which were essen-tial to people's everyday lives.
1 Therefore, administrative approval reform was carried out in the municipal governments to minimise the items of administrative examination and approval, to rationalize the administrative procedure for the purpose of improving regulatory services of government and to enhance government efficiency (Qingdao Municipal Government, 2001, p. 2) .
In addition, another way of improving public services was to disclose government information to the public and to encourage citizens' participation in monitoring local government affairs. However, before the economic reform in 1978, much government information was listed as confidential according to the document of "Provisional Regulation on Guarding State Secrets" circulated in 1951. In 1988 "The Law of the People's Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets" was enforced, which narrowed the scope of national secrets down to seven aspects including national defence, diplomatic activities, national economic and social development.
2 However, the scope of confidential government information was broad and the released government information was relatively limited.
In this case, citizens could only get limited government information such as government news from newspapers or on television. Consequently, the public could not monitor the decision-making process effectively due to a lack of information and transparency which had hindered "attempts to hold government accountable for the delivery of public services" (ADB, 2003, p. 62) . Therefore, the administrative reform in Qingdao city was designed to improve the accessibility of public information by improving its government website (Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office, 2002, p. 345) .
Moreover, the lack of external scrutiny and observation by the public participation in the local government had also impeded the possible improvement of public service delivery. For a long time, contacting citizens was only an institutionalized form of public participation in China to solicit and deal with public complaints (Luehrmann, 2003, p. 847) . This kind of political participation, to some extent, provided the governments with the "chance to systematically gather information about popular preferences and officials' behaviour" (Luehrmann, 2003, p. 848) . However, even contacting citizens could not fully perform the functions of scrutiny and supervision because the government has manipulated this channel. Therefore, local government reform in the Qingdao municipality was aimed to strengthen the level of public participation through inventing more channels of public participation in order to improve services (Xia, 2003, pp. 15-16) .
Qingdao municipality is the economic centre of Shandong province. It is a centrally-planned city (jihua danlie shi) approved by the State Council. With rapid economic development, administrative reform initiated by the Qingdao government has gone through many interesting experiences worthy of study among other municipalities in Shandong province.
According to the ADB (2003), public services in China may be classified into three major categories: "infrastructure construction and operation, including public utilities; human services; and services of a regulatory nature, such as registration and licensing" (p. 55). Rather than discussing reform in the delivery of infrastructure construction, this paper will focus on the improvement of the delivery of human services and services of a regulatory nature since these two aspects constitute the core of local government reform in Qingdao city. This paper will assess the effectiveness of the reform of improving public service delivery and identify the factors responsible for the improvements in public service delivery in Qingdao municipality. It begins with a description of the policy context and discusses how the policy context affects the improvement of public service delivery in Qingdao municipality. It then discusses the efforts of improving the delivery of public service through enhancing human service delivery, reforming the administrative approval system and increasing government transparency and public participation in Qingdao municipality. Finally, this paper will identify the factors affecting the improvement of public service delivery in Qingdao municipality in terms of the decentralization of economic management, tax profit sharing with the local government, political control, the delegation of law-making and the local leadership.
Policy Context
Qingdao city is located in Shandong province, which is situated in the eastern part of China on the lower reaches of the Yellow River. Shandong province borders the Bohai sea and Yellow sea on the eastern side, and overlooks South Korea and Japan across a vast stretch of sea. Because of this geographical advantage, Shandong province is an important coastal and economic province in China. It has a land area of 156,000 square kilometres and a population of 90 million (Shandong Yearbook Editorial Department, 2005) . Shandong province is divided into 17 municipalities, 49 districts, 31 county-level cities and 60 counties. The 17 municipalities include Jinan (capital), Qing-dao, Yantai, Weihai, Zibo, Weifang, Tai'an, Dongying, Jining, Rizhao, Liaocheng, Linyi, Laiwu, Heze, Zaozhuang, Dezhou and Binzhou (Shandong Statistical Bureau, 2004, p. 3).
Qingdao city is located at the southern tip of the Shandong Peninsula facing the Yellow Sea. It covers an area of 10,654 square km and has a population of 7.31 million in 2006 (Qingdao Statistical Bureau, 2005) . It is currently divided into seven urban districts, namely, Shinan, Shibei, Sifang, Licang, Laoshan, Chengyang, Huangdao, and five county-level cities, namely, Jimo, Jiaozhou, Jiaonian, Pingdu, and Laixi (Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office, 2003 Qingdao's strong economic power has facilitated the implementation of economic and administrative reforms. Obviously, a city with strong economic power will have more revenue to improve city infrastructure and social security. 4 With regard to city infrastructure, Qingdao government invested RMB 1985.02 million in 2002 for capital construction (Qingdao Statistical Bureau, 2003, p. 93) . As for social relief, the minimal living security standard for urban residents in Qingdao city was RMB 230 per month in 2005, which ranked first among 17 cities in Shandong province.
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Improving Public Service Delivery
Improving Public Service Delivery According to the ADB, improving human service delivery resulted from the fact that with the transition from a planned economy to a market economy, work units 6 would no longer provide human services for the citizens in terms of education, health and social security (ADB, 2003, p. 56) . Moreover, the local government could hardly provide sufficient human services due to the lack of funding (Li, 2004, p. 258) . Drawing from international experience, the local governments in China mainly implemented privatization, which was primarily aimed to attract more resources from society to supplement the public school and the university system, and to share the responsibility of improving the quality of human service and relieving their own financial stress.
With regard to privatization in education, the Qingdao government was dedicated to attracting more resources from the society to supplement the public school and the university system, an approach called "shehui liliang banxue." In primary and secondary education, the government encouraged investors to set up private schools by providing them with preferential policies. These policies have made it possible for the investors to gain profits by investing in private schools while having the status of an authorized educational institution approved by the government (Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office, 2003, p. 231) . By the end of 2002, the total number of students in private schools of Qingdao city reached 126,600, contributing to 0.17 per cent in the total number of students in public primary and secondary schools (Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office, 2003, p. 231) .
In the field of higher education, private colleges and universities had emerged in Qingdao city increasingly. This measure allowed more students, who could not meet the admission criteria of more well-established public universities, to enroll in private colleges or universities to receive higher education. In 1999, the number of enrolment in universities per 10,000 persons in Qingdao city was 48 students and in 2003 it had increased to 234 students (Qingdao Statistical Bureau, 2000 (See Table 1 ).
The privatization of education has forced citizens to bear more financial responsibilities on their own in receiving education, which relieved the government from financial stress to a certain extent. Since 1998, the Ministry of Education has allowed that Qingdao Ocean University to charge higher tuition fees. From then on, all public universities in Qingdao city started to charge or raise tuition fees which were free previously.
Similarly, in regard to social security and health care, the Qingdao government introduced a responsibility sharing system, where the government, employers, and employees all made their contribution to the employees' welfare package. Pension insurance, medical insurance and unemployment insurance are the three basic types of insurance that are covered by this system (Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office, 2003, pp. 268-269) . However, the distribution model has yet to be established to determine to what extent employers, employees and the government should pay for the insurance premium until the present time. The current situation is that the municipal governments in Shandong province have different policies for distributing the insurance premium among the local government, employers and employees.
The only confirmed matter in this reform was that employees would pay for the major part of the insurance premium, although in rich areas the local government or profitable enterprises would cover a larger proportion of the insurance premium for their employees. This led to different coverage rates of insurance among different cities. Among 17 cities in Shandong province, the coverage rates of pension insurance of urban employees in Qingdao city was the highest, 86.30% in 2004 (Shandong Statistical Bureau, 2005) .
For instance, in the villages of Laoshan district in Qingdao city, the village and Laoshan district pay up to 30 per cent of pension and medical insurance premium for farmers who would only need to pay for the remaining 70 per cent. If farmers in these villages are 60 years old for a man or 55 years old for a woman, they could receive RMB 352 per month as their pension and RMB 1,000 as an additional subsidy, which would be paid in full by the district government and the village. 7 In contrast, in some villages in Linyi city, Heze city and Liaocheng city, the poorer areas in Shandong, farmers would have to pay the total insurance premium since the county and village would not have sufficient funds for paying the insurance premium. Not surprisingly, in these poorer areas, it was very difficult to persuade farmers to pay for the insurance premium since most of them, living in poverty or just above the poverty line, would not want to pay additional money for the insurance premium, which was often considered unnecessary.
Apart from the process of privatization, what has attracted wide attention has been the establishment by the Qingdao government in 2004 of a new urban and rural social security system, called the "Sunshine Aid Project" (yangguang jiuzhu gongcheng) to ensure transparency, openness, fairness, and kindness (wennuan) in this system (Qingdao Civil Affairs Bureau, 2004) . The aim of this project was to provide more assistance of social security for the poor rather than only focusing on delivering the poor from starvation, and to openly and fairly distribute the limited funds of social security in the districts and villages of Qingdao city. The "Sunshine Aid Project" has devised five mechanisms for improving social security: (1) the "four category administrative mechanism" which consists of city, district (county), street (township/town), and neighbourhood (village) committees; (2) the "household eligibility evaluation mechanism" which investigates pensioners' income and living conditions; (3) the "procedure standardization mechanism" which regulates every step of the social security process from application to approval; (4) the "classification mechanism" which provides different services according to pensioners' individual and family conditions; and (5) the "supervision mechanism" which incorporates citizens, social security inspectors and the media (Qingdao Civil Affairs Bureau, 2004) .
The project has also proposed multiple methods for providing social security. Apart from meeting the basic living needs of the poor people, the Qing- Qingdao Municipality, 1999 Source : Qingdao Statistical Bureau (2000 , Qingdao tongji nianjian 2000 [Qingdao Statistical Yearbook 2000 , Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2000-2003, p. 17 (2000), p. 15 (2001), p. 15 (2002), p. 35 (2003), p. 16 (2004). dao Civil Affairs Bureau has explored several methods for enhancing the connections between the urban and the rural social security system in terms of granting temporary aid, housing, health, and education aid, and private mutual aid.
By the end of November 2004, the Qingdao municipal government had spent RMB 60.55 million to provide social security for over 15,870 households and 37,110 persons in urban areas of Qingdao city, which accounted for 1.5 percent of its total population (Qingdao Civil Affairs Bureau, 2004) . In this sense, the establishment of the "Sunshine Aid Project" safeguarded basic living conditions for the poor people in urban and rural areas and guaranteed family and social stability to some extent. More important, it is a good example to show how the Qingdao government is trying to take care of its citizens' interests and the vulnerable communities in the society.
Reforming Administrative Examination and Approval System
Administrative approval reform was carried out for the purpose of solving the problem of the expansion of regulation, which had not only wasted too much time for foreign investors and clients but also had weakened the efficiency of local government. Moreover, it was an imperative task for the local government to change the administrative examination and approval system. This was because numerous approval and licensing requirements had empowered the government agencies to make decisions for private firms and for the market, which had generated many rent-seeking opportunities for the agencies accordingly (Yang, 2004, p. 152) .
Therefore, in 1999, the Qingdao government requested the government agencies to reduce the items of administrative examination and approval and to simplify and standardize the procedures of examination and approval (Qingdao Municipal Government, 2001, p. 2) . This reform focused on two aspects: reducing government intervention and rationalizing administrative procedure.
Reducing government intervention has taken the form of narrowing down the scope of examination and approval and limiting the agencies' power. The Qingdao, government eliminated the administrative approval items which were in conflict with the rules of WTO such as the approval of financial registration for foreign invested enterprises, the check on the accounting of revenue and expenditure for foreign invested enterprises 9 and the examination on direct import and export for the industrial enterprises. The Qingdao government also eliminated the items which could not be adapted to the separation of local government from the enterprises, such as the approval of the merger and bankruptcy of enterprises under the jurisdiction of the municipal government and the examination of a changing equity structure of share-holding enterprises approved by the municipal government (Qingdao Municipal Government, 2001, p. 2) . As a result, through the reform, the administrative approval items in the Qingdao government were reduced by 70.63%, which indicated that the Qingdao government had reduced the most administrative approval items among the 17 municipalities in Shandong province (Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office, 2002, p. 243) . This is not surprising as the Qingdao government had faced more pressure than other municipal governments in Shandong province in terms of reducing government intervention so as to attract more foreign investment. After China's entry into WTO, more and more foreign investors came to Shandong province to establish factories and Qingdao city was always the most favoured city with its status as the economic centre of Shandong.
The Qingdao government had also set up several effective service models such as the one-stop shops (yizhanshi fuwu) and the government affairs hall (zhengwu dating), "physically concentrating related units so that customers can go through all formalities in a single designated place" (ADB, 2003, p. 58) . One-stop shops were established for the purpose of reducing costs and enhancing efficiency as well as customer service. Citizens and enterprises, especially foreign invested enterprises in Qingdao city could get the examination and approval from government agencies more easily and quickly than before. These agencies including the Local Taxation Bureau, the Administration for Industry and Commerce, the Environmental Protection Bureau and the Health Bureau, opened representative offices in the government affairs hall (Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office, 2003, p. 86) . Such one-stop shops (yizhanshi fuwu) and the government affairs hall (zhengwu dating) provided a model for other cities in Shandong province, such as Linyi, Laiwu and Zibo.
Government Transparency and Public Participation
A lack of transparency would hinder citizens from monitoring the decision-making process carried out by the government (ADB, 2003, p. 62) . Therefore, the Qingdao municipal government aims to improve the level of local government transparency and public participation. Zhang Huilai, the Secretary of the Qing-dao municipal Committee of the CCP, had required governments at all levels to double their efforts towards the goal of making government affairs transparent to the public in order to ensure that this system could be institutionalized and become a regular practice (Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office, 2002, p. 345) . The establishment of the government information website is an important step forward for improving public information in Qingdao city.
According , 2005) . This is because its government website provides the most comprehensive, detailed and prompt government information to the public, which has established its reputation for being transparent, efficient and close to its people (State Council Informatization Office of China, 2005) . This government website not only provides general information such as government documents, regulations, statistical data, department information and government news, but also such important information as personnel appointment and removal, government procurement, and financial revenue and expenditure. Furthermore, the Qingdao government website updates the content of government information frequently so that the public can receive government information on a regular basis (State Council Informatization Office of China, 2005). More specifically, the level of openness of government information on the Qingdao government website is the highest among 333 Chinese municipal governments. For example, regarding government bidding, the Qingdao government's website provides very detailed information including bid proposals, the name of enterprise which has won a bid and the date when the bid was won.
A transparent government also means transparency in the civil service system. With the promulgation of the "Provisional Regulations on National Civil Servants" (guojia gongwuyuan zanxing tiaoli) in 1993, the Qingdao government has implemented the open recruitment examination system by requiring all newly recruited civil servants to pass an examination and announcing their names on the local government websites. The Qingdao government has also carried out the cadre selection process with an open and fair competition (gongkai xuanba lingdao ganbu) since 1999. The system of pre-appointment announcement (renqian gongshi zhidu) is also popular in cadre appointment in recent years. However, guanxi (personal connections) and houmen (back door practices) practices have hindered the implementation of these systems and the sale and purchase of official positions has further eroded the principle of cadre selection through an open and fair competition in Qingdao city. 10 Therefore, achieving government transparency is a long-term goal of local government reform in China.
In addition to improving government transparency, the lack of public scrutiny in local government affairs also impeded the improvement of public service delivery. In this case, the Qingdao government opened numerous channels for broader public participation in order to improve government services in 1999.
One channel was to solicit and deal with public complaints through letters and telephone calls, which was a continuation of the "correspondence and visit system" (xinfang zhidu) established in the 1950s. The contents of public complaints often varied from community relations, public service, economic livelihood, to political affairs and appeals (Luehrmann, 2003, pp. 861-865) . Since the mid-1990s, in addition to writing complaint letters to the relevant bureau and making personal visits to the bureau, people could use more channels to express complaints, such as sending letters to the media or call various "hotlines" (Luehrmann, 2003, p. 846) . After 1999, the Qingdao municipality established the Mayor public telephone and Mayor email box to handle complaints, protests and consultation. By the end of 2001, the Mayor public telephone and e-mail box of Qingdao city had received 119,398 letters and calls from various institutions and citizens, and 90% of these letters and calls were answered by the mayor and the leaders of related government departments (Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office, 2003, p. 57) .
However, the communication of a complaint between the government official and citizens does not necessarily lead to the resolution of the problem. Sometimes, the complaints made by people "are often mishandled by leaders, being ignored at best and manipulated at worst" (Luehrmann, 2003, p. 866) . Luehrmann (2003) argued that "leaders attempt to limit input from the masses, by specifying formal restrictions on group complaints and by making it politically difficult to pursue sensitive grievances" (p. 846). Nonetheless, the voices of citizens had indeed provided important information to "help local leaders understand the sources of popular discontent, and possibly even discern avenues for heading off problems or even full-blown crises" (Luehrmann, 2003, p. 865) .
In this case, local government in China must not only widen the methods of receiving public com-plaints but also take the problems raised by citizens seriously. Fortunately, since the 1999 reform, the Qingdao municipality started to resolve the problems raised by citizens. For instance, the Qingdao government and the broadcasting stations in Qingdao city had jointly set up hot lines for public complaints. Since this kind of communication was in the form of a live one-on-one conversation, the local leaders who were responsible for answering particular questions needed to respond to the audience's enquiries immediately. This kind of communication has proven to be more effective than other communication channels (letters, visits and email) in settling public complaints.
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Secondly, Qingdao city is the first city in China to conduct public hearings on the pricing system (Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office, 2003, pp. 101-102, 197-200, 212-213 & 227) . The public hearing on the pricing system established a new mechanism which involved the local government, managers of monopoly trade and customers. It had also provided a way for citizens to participate in the decision-making process. In 2000, the citizens invited to the public hearing meetings on collecting fees in primary and secondary schools in Qingdao city had successfully persuaded the schools to reduce some of the unauthorized fees (Zhang, 2005, pp. 3-12) . This case showed that this kind of public hearing meeting had contributed to the enhancement of citizens' participation. Yet, it was still a preliminary step because these public hearings only focused on the issues of public utilities such as adjusting water prices and taxi surcharges. More important subjects such as government decisions, administrative law enforcement and procuratorate affairs were yet to be discussed.
Moreover, in other cities, those citizens who were invited to attend public hearing meetings did not represent a consensus among all citizens. For instance, in 2002, the public hearing meeting on increasing bus fare was held by the Jinan 12 Price Control Bureau. Twenty eight representatives were selected to participate in this meeting. Among these representatives, nine representatives were senior government officials from different bureaus. Among the other 19 customer representatives, there was only one grass-root customer and the other 18 were company managers, scholars, senior engineers, representatives of the People's Congress, and members of the Municipal Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, who enjoyed higher social status and had rarely used any public transportation (Song, 2002) . In this case, it was understandable that the result of the public hearing was an increase in the bus fare. Therefore, many public hearing meetings that intended to evaluate the price had ironically become the means for "increasing price" after these public hearings.
Finally, Qingdao municipality is the only city in Shandong province to encourage more citizens to be involved in the process of policy-making. This form of public participation was first carried out in the Qingdao Civil Affairs Bureau. To prevent opaque administration (anxiang caozuo), the "Sunshine Aid Project" in the civil affairs bureau established a social security evaluation committee to discuss whether the applicants for social security met the standards for pensioners. This committee included applicants for social security, accredited deputies of the National People's Congress in the community, members of the Political Consultation Congress in the community, the supervisor of social security from the civil affairs bureau of district government, officials of social security from the neighbourhood residents' committee and the street affairs agency, as well as representatives of residents including the neighbours of the applicants and the administrator of the applicants' residence (Qingdao Civil Affairs Bureau, 2004, pp. 2-4) . This prompted a self-governing function of the neighbourhood committee and reduced problems caused by opaque administration.
Factors Affecting the Improvement of Public Service Delivery
Decentralization of Economic Management
The central government gradually extended its economic management authority over the municipal government for the purpose of establishing the management system of a national economy centred on the city. In 1983, the State Council approved 14 cities 13 as centrally-planned cities (jihua danlie shi) because of their important economic status. A prefecture of China must meet the following four criteria to become a centrally-planned city: (1) an urban centre with a non-rural population over 1,000,000; (2) an Annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of over 15 billion RMB; (3) a well-established foundation for industry and business reinforced by strong technology power; and (4) playing a significant role in economic development and reform in China ("Definition of Centrally-planned City," 2006). The 14 cities had both economic management and fiscal management autonomy at the provincial level (Xie et al., 1998, p. 71; Fu, Yuan & Rui, 2004, p. 223 ). Qingdao city is the only city approved as a centrally-planned city in Shandong province. In this case, Qingdao city enjoys both the economic and fiscal management autonomy at the provincial level.
The Qingdao government has economic management authority at the provincial level in areas such as granting approval in investment and collecting taxes. According to the Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises (1991),
The income tax on enterprises with foreign investment and the income tax which shall be paid by foreign enterprises on the income of their establishments or places set up in China to engage in production or business operations shall be computed on the taxable income at the rate of thirty percent, and local income tax shall be computed on the taxable income at the rate of three percent (article 5).
However, for the income tax on enterprises with foreign investment of a production nature established in the coastal economic open zones, where the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) or the Economic and Technological Development Zones (ETDZs) are located, shall be levied at a reduced rate of 24%. 15 Thus, foreign enterprises in the SEZs or ETDZs of Qingdao city is eligible for privileged tax policies. Since other cities in Shandong province do not have the same level of authority over economic management, foreign enterprises cannot enjoy these preferential policies. Consequently, most of these enterprises have congregated in the coastal and open cities, such as Qingdao city, instead of inland cities, such as Dezhou and Linyi cities in Shandong province. In addition, the limit in examining and granting approval to foreign investment has been increased to US$100 million in Qingdao city after they are promoted as sub-provincial cities whereas the other municipal governments except the Jinan government in Shandong province still have to struggle within these limitations (Shandong Provincial Government, 2005) . Thus, Qingdao city has experienced faster development than other regular cities in Shandong province. Its strong economic foundation has contributed to the improvement of public service delivery in the education, health, and social security sectors.
Taxation Sharing with the Local Government
The central government has carried out chuizhi guanli (hierarchical control through vertical administration) in the taxation system from the central to county level after 1998. Before implementing this measure, the taxation law has stated that the local governments at various levels should strengthen their leadership in the administration of tax collection within their jurisdictions and support the tax authorities in carrying out their duties in tax collection. 16 Chuizhi guanli means that the Taxation Bureau at every level should be under the jurisdiction of a higher level Taxation Bureau in all the aspects of the organizational structuring, staff recruitment, appointment of leaders, and budgeting.
According to the chuizhi guanli system, the Qingdao State Taxation Bureau is directly under the jurisdiction of the State Administration of Taxation rather than the Provincial State Taxation Bureau since Qingdao city as a centrally-planned city has fiscal management authority at the provincial level. The Qingdao Local Taxation Bureau is directly under the jurisdiction of the municipal government instead of the provincial government. Therefore, the Qingdao government enjoys much more autonomy in the management of fiscal revenue and expenditure than other municipal governments in Shandong province. Consequently, more financial revenue has been transferred to the municipal coffers in Qingdao city whereas in other cities of Shandong province, most of the local financial revenue is transferred to the provincial and central coffers.
Political Control
Apart from economic decentralization, the central government has also strengthened its political control over the local government through the nomenklatura system. The term nomenklatura comes from the former USSR, a notion that consists of "lists of leading positions over which party units exercise the power of appointment and dismissal, lists of reserve candidates for those positions, and rules governing the actual processes of appointments and dismissals" (Lieberthal, 2004, p. 234) .
The 1990 nomenklatura had given the central authority control over sub-provincial level chiefs, "adding the positions of prefectural bureau chief and deputy chief to the central Organization Department's scope of management" (Burns, 1994, pp. 468-469) . The Organization Department has strengthened its supervision of appointment and removal of heads and deputy heads of prefectures and prefecture-level cities (Burns, 1994, p. 469) . More specifically, the nomenklatura has extended the CCP's personnel authority to China's five centrally planned cities including Qingdao and 15 sub-provincial level cities. According to Burns: This move can be seen as a further limited re-centralization of nomenklatura authority. The change may have been prompted by appeals from city officials who sought to reduce the influence of provincial leaders in municipal affairs. As a result of the change, city officials had direct access to Beijing (Burns, 1994, p. 469) .
The mayor of a centrally-planned city or a subprovincial city such as Qingdao city is equal in political status to a vice-governor of a province, who is appointed by the central authority directly. In contrast, the mayor of a prefecture-level city such as Zibo city in Shandong province is equal in status to a bureau chief in a province or a vice-mayor in a sub-provincial level city, who is appointed by the provincial authority. In this case, leaders in the Qingdao government are more acquainted with the central government than the ones in the prefecture-level government since they are directly appointed by the central government. Burns (1994) has observed that in the relationship between the provincial and central governments, "top Party leaders select provincial (and military) officials, [and] they in turn, through their membership of the CCP Central Committee, select the top Party leaders. Central and provincial leaders are therefore caught in a relationship of interdependence" (p. 470). Burns (1994) has also pointed out that "Deng Xiaoping's early 1980s strategy of 'playing to the provinces' to build a coalition of support for reform and create a political counterweight to the central bureaucracy strengthened the hand of [the] provincial leaders vis-à-vis the Centre" (p. 470). The relationship between a sub-provincial city and the central government is quite similar to the relationship between a provincial government and the central government. Through the political control over the sub-provincial cities and with increased trust between the central and sub-provincial governments, the central government has given more support to the Qingdao government for their administrative reforms. With the central government's support, the Qingdao government has been encouraged to implement innovative reform measures like the "Sunshine Aid Project."
Delegation of Law-making
According to the Organic Law of the Local People's Congresses and Local People's Governments of the People's Republic of China, local governments at the levels of province, autonomous region and centrally administered municipalities (zhixiashi) can establish regulations based on various laws such as the administrative laws and the local laws. The municipalities, which are the bases of the provincial and autonomous region governments, and larger municipalities (jiaoda de shi) approved by the State Council such as the subprovincial level city, can establish regulations according to the administrative laws and local laws.
17 Local governments at the township level, however, do not have the authority to establish these regulations.
The legislative system in China has four tiers. The first tier is the National People's Congress (NPC) and the second tier is the State Council and its subordinate units. The third tier is the People's Congress and government at the provincial level and the fourth tier is the People's Congress and government of the sub-provincial city (Xie et al., 1998, p.88) .
According to these four categories of the legislative system, the People's Congress and government at the Qingdao municipality have the authority to establish local laws and regulations based on their local contexts. In contrast, the People's Congress and government at the prefecture-level city have little authority to formulate local laws and regulations. Indeed, the absence of specific local laws to meet the needs of local economic and administrative management in prefecture-level cities has caused much confusion on some issues in local government reform and has delayed the process of solving problems, which has in return hindered the development of their local economy.
For instance, social insurance is a relatively new matter for farmers in the process of local government reform. Until now, there are only general rules rather than specific laws on this matter in China. This lack of detailed regulations has caused many problems, such as the evaluation on the amount of insurance premium to be collected by the local government in the process of providing social insurance for farmers. In this case, it is urgent for local governments to issue relevant laws by themselves. The Qingdao government has issued the "Provisional Regulations on Basic Pension for Farmers" in 2005 and many farmers have benefited from this regulation. For instance, in the villages of the Laoshan district in Qingdao city, almost 90% of the farmers have bought pension insurance by paying 70% of the premium themselves with the remaining 30% being paid by the villages and Laoshan district. When these farmers reach 60 years of age for men or 55 for women, they will receive RMB 352 each per month as pension and RMB 1,000 as an additional subsidy.
Therefore, the authority in formulating local laws in Qingdao city has facilitated its administrative reform since its government can formulate new local laws to satisfy the need for local economic and administrative management.
Local Leadership
With regard to the local leadership in the 17 cities of Shandong province, the leaders in Qingdao city are the most famous for their creative and dynamic reform measures. One of the famous leaders is Yu Zhengsheng. Even now, Qingdao people have praised the work of Yu, the former mayor and former secretary of the Qingdao municipal committee of the CCP 18 and attributed the achievements in economic and administrative reform to him.
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From 1989 to 1994, Yu was the mayor of Qingdao city and from 1992 to 1997, he was the secretary of the Qingdao municipal committee of the CCP. During his term of office, he claimed that Qingdao government officials should liberate their minds and change their attitudes to embrace a market economic system (Yu, 1996, pp. 1-6) . In the "1993 Qingdao Government Work Report," Yu (1993) indicated that the Qingdao government at all levels should concentrate on performing overall planning, coordinating, providing services, and supervising functions so as to provide better services for the enterprises and the public.
Because of Yu's work, Qingdao city has developed quickly since 1998. His successor, Zhang Huilai, 20 was appointed as the first party secretary of the Qingdao municipality in 1997. Wang Jiarui, 21 was appointed to be the mayor of Qingdao municipality in 1998. Since then, administrative reform in Qingdao municipality has been further accelerated.
Wang received his Ph.D. in economics from Fudan University and he is called the "doctor mayor." As a researcher himself, Wang understands that the main problem in establishing a modern enterprise system in China is the lack of a clear boundary between the functions of government and enterprises (zhengqi bufen). Therefore, he has made efforts in reforming the SOEs in Qingdao city and indicated that the government functions should catch up with the SOE reform (Wang, 2000, pp. 11-12) . More specifically, Wang has stressed the importance of education being a scholar himself. During his administrative period, Wang has claimed that a modern and international city should not only include a good city infrastructure and a developed economy, but also the morality of its citizens, which represents the real core of a city. For this purpose, he has requested the Qingdao Education Bureau to initiate the programme of moral education in elementary schools, middle schools and universities (Wang, 2000, p. 12) .
Zhang is another effective secretary of Qingdao city after Yu. Like Yu, before taking the position as the mayor of Qingdao city, Zhang was the secretary of the Dezhou municipal committee of the CCP in Shandong province from December 1992 to August 1995 and he was the secretary of Shandong Provincial Political and Legislative Affairs Committee of the CCP from August 1995 to January 1996. In October 1997, Zhang was appointed as the secretary of the Qingdao municipal committee (Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office, 2000, p. 309) .
In 2002, Jiang Zemin stepped down from his position and Hu Jintao was appointed as the General Secretary of the CCP. Hu (2004) suggested the new idea of "Putting People First" (yi min wei ben) for the government administration. Following Hu's idea, Zhang is the first municipal leader in Shandong province to introduce the idea of "service-oriented government" for administrative reform (Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office, 2002, p. 345) . During Zhang's term of office, the Qingdao government has carried out "five projects" (wuxiang gongcheng) in the government management system to change the government officials' attitudes to public service and enhance the overall effectiveness of the government departments. The Qingdao government leaders have responded faster in accepting and applying new administrative concepts than other cities in Shandong province, and this explains why the Qingdao government has excelled in public service delivery sector.
From Wang to Zhang, the Qingdao government has actively promoted the level of government transparency. Wang is the first mayor in China to establish the Mayor email box to handle complaints and consultations, which has helped citizens out of difficulties and strengthened the connection between them. Zhang has also encouraged citizens to be involved in the decision-making process in important public affairs. Therefore, during Wang and Zhang's administrative periods, the number of cases in public hearings is increased as well as the level of transparency within the government.
Conclusion
Compared with other municipalities in Shandong province, the status of being a business centre and its open-minded characteristic has helped the Qingdao government in implementing administrative reform.
Borrowing from international experiences, the Qingdao government adopted the measure of privatization in improving the education services. Moreover, in the social security and health care sectors, a uniform social security system needed to be established in Shandong province for the purpose of providing pension, medical and unemployment insurances. Yet, due to a regional disparity in development, the Qing-and export in foreign trade, labour salary, technological development planning, foreign exchange allocation and financial credit. 15 
